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CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-Capital Murder-Vicarious Liability
Requires a Finding of Capital Murder When a

Nonfelon Kills a Peace Officer in Response
to a Felon's Lethal Provocation
Blansett v. State,
556 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
Clifford S. Blansett and Billy Wayne Dowden entered the Orange city
jail and by armed force attempted to release Dowden's brother. Dowden
initiated a gunbattle with Officer Windham who was in the dispatcher's
office. During the gunfight, Captain Danny Gray was killed by a bullet
from Officer Windham's gun. There was no evidence that Blansett ever
fired his gun.
Blansett was indicted under section 19.03(a)(1) of the capital murder
statute of the Texas Penal Code,' and received a life sentence.2 On appeal
to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Blansett argued that he could not
be found guilty of capital murder on the theories of causation and criminal
responsibility presented to the jury. Held-Affirmed. The doctrine of vicarious liability requires a finding of capital murder when a nonfelon kills
a peace officer in response to a felon's lethal provocation.'
A fundamental principle of criminal law is that there must be not only
1. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) states, "A person commits an
offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and the person
murders a peace officer ... who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who
the person knows is a peace officer .... " Murder is "intentionally or knowingly [causing]
the death of an individual." Id. § 19.02(a)(1).
2. Capital murder is punishable by life imprisonment or death. Id. § 12.31(a). To impose
the death penalty the jury must answer affirmatively all special issues submitted under
article 37.071(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. These issues are:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CalM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978). Only the jury's refusal to
answer the issue of deliberateness affirmatively prevented Blansett from receiving the death
penalty. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 327 n.6 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1977). For a thorough
discussion of the constitutionality of the death penalty in felony-murder cases, see Comment,
The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REv.
356 (1978).
3. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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a wrongful act but a criminal intention to do that act in order for an
individual to be held criminally responsible.' This principle is embodied
in the requirement of mens rea.5 Unless an individual has the required
mens rea at the time of the offense, an injury inflicted by him cannot
amount to a crime.' When there is more than one individual involved in
the infliction of an injury it is possible for the mens rea of one to be
attributed to the other. The felony-murder rule can be used as a means of
attributing to one felon the required mens rea for murder for the acts of
his cofelon.1
The common law felony-murder rule required that the defendant or a
confederate commit the fatal act in furtherance of the initial felony.' This
rule was followed throughout the United States until the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted proximate cause as a basis for imposing liability
4. E.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,
227 (1957); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952). The Texas Penal Code has
codified this requirement. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon 1974) with
id. § 6.01(a) and id. § 6.02.
5. Mens rea has a universal meaning. If a person voluntarily violates a command of the
criminal law, that person has acted in a blameworthy manner and is criminally responsible.
Mens rea is used synonymously with culpability, scienter, intent, and malice aforethought.
See United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941); Banks v. State, 85 Tex.
Crim. 165, 166, 211 S.W. 217, 217 (1919); Harris v. State, 8 Tex. Crim. 90, 100-01 (1880);
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 1004-16 (1932).
6. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see Perkins, A Rationale of
Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REv. 905, 925 (1939).
7. See State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 21 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d
472, 476 (Pa. 1958). The drafters of the Model Penal Code recommended eliminating the
felony-murder rule except to the extent of establishing murder by an act "committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life."
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, Comments at 33-39 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). England
abolished felony-murder in section 1 of the Homicide Act of 1957. See Homicide Act, 1957, 5
& 6 Eliz., c. 11, § 1.
8. E.g., Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 338, 339 (Ill. 1888); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89
Mass. (7 Allen) 541, 544 (1863); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 21 (N.J. 1977); Commonwealth
v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 480 (Pa. 1958). The traditional application of the felony-murder rule
is known as the agency theory. Under this theory, the felony-murder rule would be inapplicable where the killing was committed by one resisting the felony because the purpose of the
doctrine, to deter felons from killing accidentally or negligently by holding them strictly
liable, would not be served by holding felons responsible for homicidal acts of others. See
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958). There are two well recognized exceptions
to the felony-murder rule. The "gun battle" exception holds felons responsible for killings
done in response to their initiation of gunfire; felons who initiate gunbattles invite resistance.
People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965); see People v. Antick,
539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975). The "shield" exception holds felons responsible
for the fatal acts of nonfelons where the felons use an innocent person as a shield to aid in
the felony or escape. The fatal act is placing the human shield in the path of opposition
gunfire. Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ark. 1934); State v. Kress, 253 A.2d 481, 487
(N.J. 1969); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 632-33, 57 S.W. 1125, 1129 (1900); Taylor v.
State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 572, 55 S.W. 961, 964 (1900).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol10/iss1/11

2

Baldwin: Vicarious Liability Requires a Finding of Capital Murder When a N

1978]

CASE NOTES

under the felony-murder rule.' While the proximate cause theory of the
felony-murder rule was adopted by a minority of jurisdictions, 0 the majority retained the common law requirements."
Historically, the Texas courts have applied the felony-murder rule
within the framework of the common law requirements." The felonymurder rule has consistently been construed to mean that any cofelon is
liable as a principal for a killing which occurs in the course of the intentional commission of another felony. Mere attempt or commission of the
felony, however, will not satisfy the requirement of intent or knowledge to
commit murder. 4 The requisite mens rea for the murder arises only when
9. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595, 599-600 (Pa. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
924 (1950) (police officer shot by fellow officer); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 53 A.2d 736, 745
(Pa. 1947) (robbery victim killed in gunfire; no proof who fired fatal shot). The proximate
cause theory of the felony-murder rule expands the common law scope of a felon's responsibility and holds felons liable for any death which is a foreseeable consequence of the initial
criminal act. The felony-murder rule is applicable under that theory when the fatal act is
done by one resisting the felony. It is foreseeable that resistance will be encountered in the
commission of a forcible felony. See People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 517 (Ill. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently reversed its
position and overruled Almeida. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 55860 (Pa. 1970).
10. See People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913
(1975); Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336, 340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963). The proximate cause
theory was also initially adopted in a few other states which apparently no longer follow it.
See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 A.2d 595 (Pa. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950),
overruled, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 558-60 (Pa. 1970). Compare
Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1955) (adopting proximate cause) and People v.
Podolski, 52 N.W.2d 201,.204 (Mich.) (adopting proximate cause), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845
(1952) with Wright v. State, 344 So. 2d 1334, 1336-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting
proximate cause) and People v. Scott, 185 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (rejecting
proximate cause).
11. State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J. 1977); see, e.g., People v. Washington, 402
P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965); People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738, 201
N.Y.S.2d 328, 331-32 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa.
1970).
12. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hilliard v.
State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gonzales v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 373, 374,
350 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1961). Some Texas cases are confusing in that proximate cause language
was used to establish the causal relation between act and result. See Thompson v. State, 514
S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (robbery of guard during jail escape should be
anticipated); Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 578, 251 S.W.2d 404, 408 (1952) (defendant
initiated scuffle which resulted in death of victim); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 572,
55 S.W. 961, 965 (1900) ("shield" case). Proximate cause as a theory of liability under the
felony-murder rule has never been used in Texas as in other jurisdictions. Compare Hilliard
v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) with People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511,
513-14 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
13. E.g., Hilliard v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Crawford v. State,
511 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Walker v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. 343, 347, 135
S.W.2d 992, 994 (1939).
14. E.g., Hilliard v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Richard v. State,
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one of the felons, in furtherance of the initial felony, commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that results in death.'5 Because of this requirement, the Texas courts do not extend the scope of the felony-murder doctrine beyond liability for killings done at the hands of the felons themselves."'
Apart from the felony-murder rule, an individual may be held criminally
responsible under the theory of vicarious liability for a murder he did not
commit.' 7 There are two distinct aspects of vicarious liability. When a
killing is done by a nonfelon acting in response to the defendant's lethal
provocation, liability is imposed under the California theory of vicarious
liability.'" Under such circumstances the defendant is guilty of murder
based on his acts in conscious disregard for life.'" When a defendant's
involvement with a murder committed under these circumstances arises
not from his own provocation, but from the provocation of an accomplice,
the defendant's liability must be based on basic rules governing complicity." This second aspect of vicarious liability is codified in the criminal
responsibility sections of the 1974 Texas Penal Code.2' Under current law,
one is liable as a party for the primary offense based on either his own
conduct or the conduct of another for whom he is criminally responsible.,
Criminal responsibility arises when an individual, acting with intent to
promote or assist the commission of an offense, aids or encourages another
person to complete the offense.2 Criminal responsibility also arises from
426 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (dissenting opinion); Burton v. State, 122 Tex.
Crim. 363, 365, 55 S.W.2d 813, 814 (1932).
15. Article 42 of the 1925 Texas Penal Code codified the requirement that the actor
commit the killing. Tex. Penal Code art. 42 (1925). Article 19.02(a)(3) narrows the scope of
article 42 by adding the requirement that the initial act be clearly dangerous to human life
and limits its application to murders committed in the course of a felony. TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
16. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hilliard
v. State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Lopez v. State, 482 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972).
17. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480-81 (1975); People
v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. 908, 918 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965); accord,
People v. Reed, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435-36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Bosby, 64 Cal. Rptr.
159, 165 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
18. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975).
19. Id. at 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
20. Id. at 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
21. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, .02 (Vernon 1974).
22. Id. § 7.01(a). Article 7.01 abolished the traditional distinctions between principals
and accomplices; all participants are equally innocent or guilty as parties. See id. § 7.01(c).
Texas previously had a complicated scheme of categories which followed the common law,
covering accountability for the acts of others. See generally Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U.
PA. L. Ray. 581 (1941). The Texas law of vicarious liability applies to all crimes, not solely
murder. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, .02 (Vernon 1974).
23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
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participation in a conspiracy. One who engages in a conspiracy is criminally responsible for the completed felonies of co-conspirators if those
crimes should have been anticipated and were committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy's objective. 4 The statute specifically provides that the
co-conspirator is liable for the completed offense "though having no intent
to commit it"; 5 criminal responsibility is based solely upon the intent to
join the conspiracy."6
For an individual to be held criminally responsible for the result of a
conspiracy, his conduct, or the conduct of a co-conspirator, must be a
direct cause of that result.Y The causation provision of the Texas Penal
Code provides that a person's acts are the cause "if the result would not
have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently
with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to
produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient."' 8 The
"but for" language holds a defendant responsible if the result would not3
2
have occurred in the absence of his conduct. ' Until Blansett v. State, 0
however, this provision had not been used to impose liability on a conspirator when a nonconspirator was the direct cause of the result.
In Blansett the defendant urged that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction of capital murder and that the court erred in instruct3
ing the jury on the theories of causation and criminal responsibility. 1
Blansett's fundamental argument was that he could be found guilty of
murder only by application of the felony-murder rule.3 2 Further, application of the felony-murder rule would not support a conviction of capital
murder as the killing was neither intentional nor done by one of the felons.3 3 Declining to apply the felony-murder doctrine, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction by finding that Blansett intentionally caused Officer Gray's death.2
24. Id. § 7.02(b).
25. Id. § 7.02(b).
26. See Cross v. State, 550 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Skidmore v. State,
530 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 1974).
27. See Anderson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 630, 631, 252 S.W.2d 189, 190 (1952); Criswell
v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 473, 477, 208 S.W.2d 896, 898 (1948); Flournoy v. State, 124 Tex.
Crim. 395, 396, 63 S.W.2d 558, 559 (1933). The requirement of direct causation is not confined
to conspiracies. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04 (Vernon 1974).
28. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a) (Vernon 1974).
29. Skidmore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); see Bubany, The
Texas Penal Code of 1974, 28 Sw. L.J. 292, 307-09 (1974).
30. 556 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
31. Id. at 324. The court instructed the jury that Blansett could be found guilty based
on his responsibility for Dowden's acts if he intentionally aided or assisted in the execution
of the conspiracy and if Dowden's acts were the cause of Officer Gray's death. Id. at 326 n.5.
32. Id. at 324 n.1. The Texas felony-murder rule is incorporated in TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
33. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
34. Id. at 325.
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The case was decided by strict application of the statutes to the facts. 3 5
Although neither Blansett nor Dowden actually committed the murder,
their conduct in entering the jail was intentional..36 The intent required for
capital murder was said to be established by the intentional use of firearms
in conscious disregard for life.37 The necessary causal relation was established by finding that the death of Officer Gray would not have occurred
but for the intentional conduct of Blansett and Dowden. 38 Using the rationale advanced by the California Supreme Court in People v. Gilbert,3 the
court announced that the acts of Officer Windham were not a concurrent
cause such as would relieve Blansett of liability. 0 The officer, while in the
discharge of his official duty, acted in reasonable response to lethal provocation.4
The Blansett court stated that the defendant could be equally guilty of
murder either because of his own conduct or because of his responsibility
for Dowden's acts in initiating the gunfire.42 The court, however, founded
its decision on a jury charge submitted on the theory of criminal responsibility. 3 Blansett's contention that the criminal responsibility provisions do
not apply to capital murder was expressly rejected. 4 The court's rejection
of this contention was based on an earlier case in which the death penalty
was upheld because of the defendant's responsibility for the acts of another.45
In assessing Blansett's liability the court of criminal appeals had several
options. The most apparent option available was utilization of the felonymurder rule. Under the traditional felony-murder rule, Blansett could not
35. See id. at 325-26. In deciding the case the court applied the culpability, causation,
criminal responsibility, and capital murder provisions of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a), 6.04(a), 7.02, 19.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
36. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
37. Id.at 325.
38. Id.at 325.
39. 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
40. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
41. Id. at 326.
42. Id. at 326.
43. Id. at 326.
44. Id. at 326.
45. Id. at 326-27 (citing Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert.
denied, U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1977)). A series of Texas cases have
established that an individual can be found guilty of capital murder based on criminal
responsibility. See Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (cofelon
killed robbery victim), cert. denied, U.S. -,
97 S.Ct. 2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1977);
Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (cofelon killed robbery victim);
Ex parte Wilson, 527 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (cofelon killed kidnap victim);
cf. Thompson v. State, 514 S.W.2d 275, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (armed robbery); Leviness v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 160, 165-66, 247 S.W.2d 115, 118 (1952) (murder). Little reasoning is advanced by the court for this result; liability is based on strict application of criminal
responsibility. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01, .02 (Vernon 1974).
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have been guilty of murder as the killing was not done by his cofelon.11 In
order to be consistent with established Texas law, the court did not consider extension of the felony-murder rule by use of the proximate cause
theory." The court could have based liability on Blansett's own conduct.
Again, he could not have been found guilty of murder as he committed
neither the killing nor an act provocative of lethal resistance.' 8 Thus, in
order to find Blansett guilty of murder, it was necessary for the court to
employ vicarious liability.'"
Under certain very limited circumstances a defendant can be found
guilty under the theory of vicarious liability. 50This theory was established
in the landmark decision of People v. Washington,' where the robbery
victim killed one of the felons. The California Supreme Court held the
defendant liable for the murder of his cofelon.52 The court reasoned that
as the felons initiated the gunbattle, it was not necessary that the defendant or his accomplice commit the killing; liability was based upon the
intentional commission of acts that were likely to kill, accompanied by a
conscious disregard for life. 3
Subsequent decisions by the California Supreme Court delineated the
principles applicable in assessing the criminal liability of felons for killings
committed by persons resisting their crimes." In essence these principles
are that, if during a felony, one of the felons commits an act which implies
malice and a nonfelon kills in reasonable response to that act, the felon
46. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hilliard v.
State, 513 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gonzales v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 373, 374,
350 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1961).
47. See Rodriquez v. State, 548 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Hilliard v. State,
513 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Gonzales v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 373, 374, 350
S.W.2d 553, 554 (1961). Faced with substantially the same facts as Blansett, the Illinois
Supreme Court imposed liability by expansion of the felony-murder rule rather than by use
of vicarious liability. See People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 517 (Ill. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 913 (1975). See cases and text note 9 supra.
48. See People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
49. See generally People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975).
50. See, e.g, People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 49-50, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 481-82 (1975) (no
vicarious liability for crime unless accomplice could be found guilty); People v. Gilbert, 408
P.2d 365, 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 918 (1965) (felon's act must be in furtherance of conspiracy),
rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 446 (1965) (felon's act must be one from which malice can be implied and provocative of lethal resistance).
51. 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
52. Id. at 132, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
53. Id. at 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 445-46.
54. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975) (police officer killed
cofelon); Taylor v. Superior Ct., 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970) (robbery victim killed
cofelon), overruled on othergrounds, People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975);
People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966) (police officer killed cofelon), rev'd
on othergrounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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and his cofelon are guilty of murder." The required malice can be implied
when, acting with a base, antisocial motive and with conscious disregard
for life, a felon intentionally commits an act which involves a probability
that death will result.56 The killing by the nonfelon must be attributable
to a life-threatening act of the felon to which the nonfelon has made a
reasonable response.57 The killing is not attributable to the object felony,
but to the felon's conscious disregard for life.58 The retaliatory acts, therefore, cannot be an intervening cause as they are a "response to the dilemma
thrust upon" the nonfelon by the intentional acts of the felon. 9
The holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmatively establishes that Texas has adopted the California theory of vicarious liability."0
Prior to the decision in Blansett this theory was unique to California. 1 By
holding Blansett responsible for a killing done in response to his cofelon's
actions, the Texas court has boldly extended the scope of criminal responsibility.
While reaching an arguably proper result, the court of criminal appeals
erred in its application of the California theory of vicarious liability. The
court suggested that Blansett could be vicariously liable for capital murder
based on his own conduct.2 As there was no evidence that Blansett fired
55. Utilization of the rules defining principals and criminal conspiracies requires that the
overt conduct precipitating the response be in furtherance of the conspiracy. See People v.
Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480-81 (1975); Taylor v. Superior Ct., 477 P.2d
131, 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970), overruled on other grounds, People v. Antick, 539 P.2d
43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975); People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917
(1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
56. People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480-81 (1975); People v.
Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S.
263 (1967); accord, People v. Bosby 64 Cal. Rptr. 159, 165 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (cofelon killed
robbery victim), aff'd sub nor. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
57. People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480-81 (1975); Taylor v.
Superior Ct., 477 P.2d 131, 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970), overruled on other grounds,
People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975). Acts less serious than initiating
gunfire can be provocative of lethal resistance. Threatening conduct may effectively initiate
gunfire. Taylor v. Superior Ct., 477 P.2d 131, 134, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970), overruled on
other grounds, People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975); accord, People v.
Reed, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435-36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (police officer killed robbery victim).
58. People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975); Taylor v. Superior
Ct., 477 P.2d 131, 133, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970), overruled on other grounds, People v.
Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975); People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373-74, 47
Cal. Rptr. 909, 917-18 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
59. People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975); People v. Gilbert,
408 P.2d 365, 373-74, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917-18 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
60. See Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
61. Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev' 1973); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 25 (N.J.
1977).
62. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The trial court
correctly submitted the case to the jury solely on Blansett's responsibility for Dowden's acts.
Id. at 326 n.5.
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his gun or engaged in any other life-threatening conduct, 13 he cannot be
said to have committed a lethally provocative act from which the intent
for murder could be implied." By suggesting that Blansett's liability could
be based on his conduct, the court misinterpreted the theory of vicarious
liability.
Vicarious liability could properly be used to establish Dowden's guilt. In
initiating the gunbattle, Dowden intentionally and with conscious disregard for life engaged in conduct likely to kill. 5 Initiating a gunbattle is
conduct which exhibits an intent to kill." The felonious intent to kill
Officer Windham was transferred into an intent to kill Officer Gray; Dowden therefore had the requisite intent for murder. 7 To find Dowden guilty
of murder, it was necessary to establish that his acts were the cause of
Officer Gray's death." As the death would not have occurred but for the
initiation of the gunbattle, Dowden's acts were the cause of death." Officer
Windham's retaliatory response could not operate to break the causal
chain and relieve Dowden of liability for the result of that response.1°
Officer Windham was acting not only in the discharge of his official duty,
but in self-defense." Dowden thus could be held guilty of capital murder
as the necessary elements of intent and causation were present.
In order to hold Blansett vicariously liable for capital murder it was
necessary to take an additional step which the court of criminal appeals
failed to do." Proper application of the California theory of vicarious liability requires that when the murder is attributable to provocation by the
defendant's co-conspirator, the defendant's liability must be based on the
rules governing principals and criminal conspiracies." Although Blansett
did not fire his gun, he accompanied Dowden to the jail to assist in the
execution of the conspiracy." Once murder was established for Dowden,
the crime could be imputed to Blansett under the co-conspirator's criminal
63. Id. at 324.
64. See People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). Entering the jail with firearms is a necessary element of the
initial felony, implements for escape. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.10 (Vernon 1974).
65. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975).
66. People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909, 917 (1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
67. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 49, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 481 (1975).
68. See Cross v. State, 550 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Skidmore v. State,
530 S.W.2d 316, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
69. See Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
70. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35 at 258 (1972).
71. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442,445 (1965); TEx. CODE
CRIM. PRO. ANN. arts. 6.06, 6.07 (Vernon .1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a) (Vernon
1974).
72. See People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1975).
73. Id. at 48, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
74. Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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responsibility provision."0 Instead of progressing through the necessary
steps, the court of criminal appeals attempted to establish Blansett's guilt
by combining his actions with those of Dowden.11 The court's failure to
properly utilize the two aspects of vicarious liability ensures its confused
application in Texas. The state of the law should not be such that an
individual could be sent to his death based on such an unclear precedent.
There is no question that under Texas law a defendant can receive the
death penalty even though he did not commit the killing." There is nothing
in the Texas Penal Code that prevents vicarious liability for capital murder." The haunting question remains as to whether this was the result
intended by the legislature in enacting the capital murder and criminal
responsibility statutes. The legislature apparently .chose to set capital
murder apart and limit its application to intentional or knowing murder
committed under specific aggravating circumstances."9 Under the current
state of the law, the elements of capital murder can be supplied vicariously
to reach a passive conspirator. 0 While perhaps the result was proper, the
court's approach was erroneous. Consequently, the result reached raises
more questions than it answers. The decision in Blansett ensures that the
law regarding vicarious liability for capital murder will require further
consideration.
In spite of the unanswered questions, this decision gives notice that an
act committed with intent to promote or assist the commission of a felonious offense will render the actor responsible not only for the contemplated
offense, but also for any collateral results."' The court has demonstrated
the power of the Texas Penal Code to reach all offenders and hold them
amenable to its dictates.
Janis E. Baldwin
75. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 7.02(b) (Vernon 1974).

76. See Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
77. See Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied,
U.S. , 97 S. Ct. 2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1977); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 697
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
78. Crump, Capital Murder: The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 538 (1977).
79. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974) with id. § 19.03.
80. See Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Livingston v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. -,
97 S. Ct.
2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1977); Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
81. See Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Cross v. State,
550 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.
U.S.
-, 97 S. Ct. 2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d' 250 (1977). In
Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, __
Cross the defendant renounced his intention to participate in the robbery after the planning
stage; he was found guilty of aggravated robbery. Cross v. State, 550 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977). In Livingston the defendant waited outside during the robbery; he was
found guilty of capital murder and the death penalty was upheld. Livingston v. State, 542
U.S.
-, 97 S. Ct. 2642, 53 L.
S.W.2d 655, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, Ed. 2d 250 (1977). It would appear from the decision in Livingston that had the Blansett jury
imposed the death penalty, it would have been upheld. See id. at 661.
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